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News	of	this	book	has	been	circulating	well	in	advance	of	its	publication,	and	it	has	been	
widely	and	eagerly	anticipated.	The	many	anthropologists	who	have	been	enthused	and	
excited,	as	well	as	those	who	have	been	provoked	or	mystified,	by	various	earlier	
manifestations	of	‘the	ontological	turn’	have	looked	forward	to	a	comprehensive	and	
authoritative	statement	of	its	principles	and	programme.	This	book	certainly	provides	that,	
and	gives	a	virtuoso	performance	in	doing	so.	It	positively	bristles	with	enthusiasm,	energy,	
and	new	ideas.	It	is	engaging	and	inventive,	spirited,	combative,	self-consciously	
contentious,	and	clearly	driven	by	a	restless,	proselytising	spirit,	but	it	also	sets	out	not	just	
to	dazzle	with	its	conspicuous	cleverness	but	also	to	persuade	by	serious	argument.	It	
succeeds	in	a	good	deal	of	what	it	sets	out	to	do,	and	even	those	who	are	least	convinced	
will	be	given	a	good	deal	to	think	about	along	the	way.	It	ought	to	be	widely	read	–	really,	
anyone	who	thinks	seriously	about	the	nature	of	anthropology	will	want	to	read	it	–	and	it	
will	certainly	change	the	terms	of	debate.	This	it	will	do	for	several	reasons,	not	least	that	its	
contents	will	come	to	so	many	as	a	surprise.		
	
The	prospect	of	nature	being	multiple,	of	the	ethnographic	record	presenting	us	with	
multiple	worlds	of	‘radical	alterity’	in	places	such	as	Amazonia,	Melanesia,	and	northern	
Mongolia,	each	of	which	requires	its	own	radically	new	concepts	aligned	with	its	radically	
other	ontology:	this	was	what	many	followers	of	‘the	turn’	have	found	most	exciting	and	
compelling.	They	are	swiftly	disabused	of	these	fantasies	in	this	book.	From	the	outset,	
Holbraad	and	Pedersen	are	clear	that	this	new	updated	version	of	the	ontological	turn	
makes	no	metaphysical	claims.	It	is	now	a	‘strictly	methodological	proposal’	(p.	ix),	which	
may	come	as	a	shock	to	those	who	took	away	from	Thinking	Through	Things	(Henare,	
Holbraad,	&	Wastell	2007)	the	idea	that	‘epistemology’	was	little	short	of	a	human	rights	
abuse.	It	is	necessary,	say	Holbraad	and	Pedersen,	to	move	on	from	debates	around	what	
they	call	the	‘first	wave’	of	manifestations	of	the	turn,	‘including	some	of	our	own	writings’.	
Understandably,	and	on	the	whole	justifiably,	they	do	not	dwell	for	long	on	just	what	in	
those	earlier	writings	gave	rise	to	such	widespread	‘misunderstandings’	(although	it	may	be	
going	just	a	wee	bit	too	far	in	self-exculpation	to	say	that	multiple	worlds	and	plural	
ontologies	were	‘flirted	with’	[p.	156]	in	texts	in	which	they	occupied	centre-stage	
theoretically,	and	often	appeared	in	the	titles).	The	important	thing	is	that	the	revision	be	
clear,	and	the	new	position	understood.	So	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	helpfully	recommend	
that	the	word	‘ontological’	be	used	only	adjectivally;	‘never	as	a	noun!’	they	almost	shout	
from	the	page,	and	therefore	never	in	the	plural.		
	
The	concept	of	‘the	ontological’	is	now	to	serve	wholly	as	a	signal	that	the	question	of	what	
kind	of	theoretical	vocabulary	we	use	should	remain	resolutely	open,	and	open	specifically	
to	influence	from	ethnographic	data.	It	is	a	call	to	a	special	and	demanding	form	of	
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intellectual	self-discipline.	The	people,	places,	and	ways	of	life	we	study	can	furnish	us	not	
only	with	objects	but	also	with	our	means	of	enquiry,	but	only	if	we	remain	open	to	having	
our	assumptions	about	what	kinds	of	things	there	are	in	the	world	(‘world’	now	once	again	
in	the	singular),	and	therefore	our	concepts,	transformed	by	what	we	learn	from	our	
ethnography.	We	do	not	already	possess,	in	the	form	of	so-called	‘critical’	social	theory,	a	
set	of	concepts	that	will	always	be	adequate	to	describing	what	there	is,	and	that	will	tell	us	
what	is	‘really	real’	and	what	is	illusory.	As	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	concede	–	indeed	they	
celebrate	it	–	this	is	not	entirely	new	because	the	history	of	anthropology	is	dotted	with	
what	they	call	‘ah	ha!	moments’	when	anthropological	analysis	has	revealed	hitherto	
unrecognised	realities	and	aspects	of	social	life.	By	radicalizing	three	long-established	
aspects	of	anthropological	enquiry	–	reflexivity	(being	self-critical	and	open	about	the	
concepts	we	use),	conceptualization	(actively	to	create	new	concepts	in	response	to	
challenges	from	the	ethnographic	data),	and	experimentation	(including	fieldworkers’	
willingness	to	experiment	on	themselves)	–	the	new	‘methodological’	project	for	the	
ontological	turn	seeks	to	enable	and	actively	pursue,	and	then	to	‘run	with’	and	make	the	
most	intellectually	of	those	‘ah-ha!	moments’.		
	
In	the	course	of	the	book,	I	am	described	more	than	once	as	a	critic	–	even	as	one	of	the	
‘most	ardent	critics’	–	of	the	original	ontological	turn.	In	fact,	I	have	always	found	it	to	be	a	
heady	mixture	of	some	highly	stimulating	and	persuasive	arguments,	and	others	whose	
point,	and	in	many	cases	connection	to	the	good	ideas,	was	rather	elusive.	It	has	therefore	
always	been	a	project	which	I	have	wished	to	take	seriously,	in	the	sense	of	considering	hard	
to	what	extent	and	in	what	ways	it	might	be	telling	me	something	new	and	true	and	
important.	This	new	version	is	undoubtedly	a	marked	improvement	on	the	original,	and	
insofar	as	the	authors	succeed	in	putting	forward	a	‘purely	methodological’	programme	it	is	
a	highly	compelling	one.	However,	I	do	not	think	they	succeed	entirely,	and	will	therefore	
pay	them	the	compliment	of	pointing	out	some	of	the	places	where	I	think	they	drift	from	
the	task	they	set	themselves.	Some	of	this	is	due	to	the	extent	to	which	their	arguments	are	
in	fact,	despite	at	least	some	of	their	intentions,	affected	by	a	set	of	specific	(Heideggerian-
cum-Deleuzian)	metaphysical	premises.	And	some	of	it	is	owing	to	the	delirious	tendency	
they	avow	of	taking	arguments	to	what	they	call	(all	on	pp.	20-21,	as	if	they	were	equivalent	
terms)	‘their	logical	conclusion’,	‘their	limits’,	and	‘the	extreme’.	Even	where	this	is	less	than	
persuasive,	it	is	never	other	than	engaging.		
	
So	how	do	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	develop	the	argument	for	this	new	methodological	
version	of	the	ontological	turn?	First	comes	a	chapter	in	which	they	distinguish	‘their’	
ontological	turn	from	a	number	of	other	superficially	similar	perspectives.	Then	there	are	
three	chapters	of	close	textual	exposition	of	the	three	thinkers	who	have	most	profoundly	
influenced	them,	in	reaching	the	views	contained	in	this	book.	And	finally,	before	a	brief	
conclusion,	there	are	two	chapters	in	which	they	illustrate	the	merits	of	the	new	
‘ontological’	project	and	how	it	improves	on	earlier	versions,	and	sketch	a	research	agenda	
to	take	things	forward.	
	
The	chapter	distinguishing	the	new	turn	from	other	‘ontological’	research	programmes	in	
and	beyond	anthropology	(‘speculative	realism’,	Latour	and	his	followers	in	Science	and	
Technology	Studies,	anthropologists	such	as	Michael	Scott,	Philippe	Descola,	and	Tim	
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Ingold)	is	brilliantly	done:	the	delineations	of	disagreements	are	crisp	and	sharp,	but	also	
courteous	and	fair	minded.		
	
The	three	expository	chapters,	respectively	on	Roy	Wagner,	Marilyn	Strathern,	and	Eduardo	
Viveiros	de	Castro,	are	also	each	in	their	different	way	a	tour	de	force.	How	interesting	and	
compelling	readers	find	them	will	depend	in	part	on	the	extent	to	which	they	share	the	
authors’	sense	of	these	thinkers	as	inspirational.		
	
From	Wagner’s	writings,	they	extract	a	call,	‘to	stage	the	encounter	with	ethnography	as	an	
experiment	in	conceptual	reflexivity’.	They	could	of	course	have	got	to	that	
recommendation	by	a	range	of	other	more	direct	and	less	fanciful	means,	but	for	anyone	
seeking	clarification	about	most	of	Wagner’s	corpus	(they	give	up	somewhat	on	the	latest	
works,	comforting	themselves	with	the	thought	that	they	are	not	meant	seriously),	there	
will	be	much	illumination	here.		
	
From	Strathern,	they	take	first	an	account	of	why	the	concept	of	the	relation	is	so	central	
and	generative	for	anthropology,	and	further	the	methodological	principle	of	taking	any	
given	subject	matter	as	a	field	of	relations.	They	handle	with	some	deftness	the	delicate	
challenge	arising	from	the	fact	that	Strathern	herself	has,	with	exquisite	politeness	but	none	
the	less	pointedly,	described	her	project	as	‘epistemological’	when	of	course	they	would	like	
it	to	be	ontological.	In	the	end,	they	are	forced	to	concede	that	it	merely	‘has	inherently	
“ontological”	implications’,	and	that	too	only	if	by	‘ontological’	we	mean	something	that	no	
one	has	hitherto	thought	implied	by	the	word	‘ontological’,	namely	‘conceptual	reflexivity	
and	experimentation’.	But	the	fact	that	Strathern	herself	may	not	have	followed	Holbraad	
and	Pedersen	all	the	way	on	their	own	trajectory	does	not	of	course	diminish	or	invalidate	
the	direction	they	take	her	ideas.	The	originality	and	sheer	virtuosity	of	what	they	do	with	
those	ideas	are	strikingly	impressive.			
	
The	chapter	on	Viveiros	de	Castro	is	rather	more	tortured	than	the	other	two,	because	it	
was	from	him	that	the	‘first	wave’	of	the	movement	got	its	original	commitment	to	multiple	
ontologies,	and	while	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	now	wish	to	drop	that	as	‘preposterously	
reifying’	their	continued	inspiration	and	devotion	is	clearly	very	strong.	So,	this	chapter	
consists	of	a	series	of	highly	creative	attempts	at	reinterpretation.	Some	of	Viveiros	de	
Castro’s	recent	writings	help	them	a	little,	but	not	very	much,	and	in	my	own	view	their	
slightly	desperate-sounding	insistence	that	his	approach	‘amounts	to	anything	but	the	kind	
of	exoticizing	essentialism	with	which	his	critics	so	often	charge	him’	(p.	160,	emphasis	in	
the	original)	fails	to	convince.	Viveiros	de	Castro	is	a	brilliant	and	creative	anthropologist,	
from	which	almost	everyone,	myself	included,	has	learned	a	very	great	deal.	But	I	do	not	
think,	as	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	try	to	suggest,	that	his	frequent	appeal	to	Deleuze	as	a	
philosophical	authority	can	be	explained	either	by	Deleuze	having	really	got	his	ideas	from	
‘Amazonian,	Melanesian,	and	other	indigenous	sources’	(his	notoriously	careless	pillaging	of	
anthropological	writings	cannot	warrant	this),	or	as	a	political	strategy	to	recruit	Deleuze	
retrospectively	as	a	‘comrade	in	arms’.	If	the	latter	is	the	case,	then	let	us	hope	that	Deleuze	
offers	better	support	from	beyond	the	grave	to	Amazonian	indigenous	rights	than	he	
offered	in	life	to	dissidents	in	Soviet-dominated	Eastern	Europe.	I	do	not	think	the	sense	
Viveiros	de	Castro	gives	to	the	expression	‘taking	seriously’	(directly	applying	an	argument	
from	Deleuze)	is	a	helpful	reference	point	for	anthropology,	and	in	particular	it	does	not	
	 4	
amount,	as	Holbraad	and	Pedersen’s	section	title	suggests,	to	taking	the	people	in	question	
seriously.	I	do	not	think	the	idea,	again,	taken	from	Deleuze,	of	‘multiplying	the	world’	
makes	any	more	sense	than	that	of	multiple	worlds.	And	I	do	not	think	Viveiros	de	Castro’s	
wish	to	promote	‘the	ontological	self-determination	of	the	world’s	peoples’	can	really	be	
made	compatible	with	a	strictly	methodological	programme,	however	radically	the	
meanings	of	‘self-determination’,	‘peoples’,	and	‘world’	are	each	redefined,	and	even	if,	as	
in	Holbraad	and	Pedersen’s	commentary,	‘conceptual’	is	conveniently	substituted	in	place	of	
‘ontological’.		
	
In	general,	Holbraad	and	Pedersen’s	task	throughout	this	book	would	have	been	a	good	deal	
easier,	one	feels,	if	they	could	have	dropped	the	label	‘ontological’	entirely,	and	instead	
used	one	of	the	ideas	for	which	this	book	shows	infinitely	more	confident	enthusiasm:	why	
not	the	‘reflexive’,	‘experimental’,	or	‘conceptual	turn’?	But	I	guess	it	was	just	too	later	for	
that.	In	any	case,	the	authors	are	surely	to	be	commended	for	their	intellectual	boldness	
and	flexibility,	in	revising	their	views	to	the	extent	that	they	have.		
	
Most	readers	might	expect	that	when	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	move	on	in	the	next	two	
chapters	to	demonstrate	what	their	proposed	new	methodology	means	in	practice,	that	
they	will	provide	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	lengthy	list	(on	p.	8)	of	recent	substantive	
ethnographic	works	that	‘adopt	an	ontological	approach’.	I’m	not	at	all	sure	that	all	the	
authors	cited	would	be	equally	happy	to	accept	this	appellation,	and	confident	that	several	
would	have	doubts	about	the	version	presented	here.	But	it	is	an	impressive	list	and	would	
certainly	form	the	basis	for	an	attractive	advertisement	for	the	‘turn’,	but	instead	they	
choose	to	illustrate	how	Mark-I	ontological-turn	analysis	can	be	improved	into	Mark	II	by	
describing	how	their	own	respective	contributions	to	Thinking	Through	Things	would	be	
revised.	The	discussion	they	present	is	creative	and	highly	interesting,	although	its	force,	for	
me,	is	weakened	by	the	fact	that	what	they	declare	to	be	the	driving	motivation	behind	
their	chapters,	in	both	the	original	and	the	revised	versions,	is	left	so	radically	unexplained.	
They	say	they	want	to	undermine	a	‘humanist’	distinction	between	persons	and	things,	and	
to	‘enhance	the	status	of	things’	in	what	they	repeatedly	refer	to	as	‘the	conceptual	
economy	of	anthropological	analysis’,	by	showing	how,	‘suitably	reconceived’,	things	can	
‘radiate	light	of	their	own’	or	‘invent’	their	own	conceptualization.	It	is	suggested	that	this	
will	contribute	to	undermining	what	Latour	calls	‘the	Modern	constitution’,	the	distinction	
said	to	be	essential	to	modernity	(and	only	that?)	between	the	material	and	non-material.	
So	the	way	they	propose	to	improve	on	their	original	analyses	is	that	in	addition	to	
attending	to	what	people	say	about	and	do	with	the	things	in	question,	they	as	
anthropologists	should	pay	attention	to	the	phenomenology	of	one’s	encounter	with	the	
things	themselves	(‘what	we	hear,	see,	smell,	taste	and	touch	of	the	thing	as	we	find	it’).	If	
not	quite	a	radical	departure	for	anthropology	as	such,	this	certainly	constitutes	a	revision	
of	the	heavily	discursive	analyses	provided	in	Thinking	Through	Things.	What	is	missing	
(perhaps	they	do	genuinely	take	it	to	be	self-evident,	in	light	of	the	current	fashion	for	post-
humanism)	is	why	this	objective	should	be	considered	desirable	in	itself,	intrinsic	to	the	
anthropological	project,	or	implied	by	their	methodological	version	of	it:	on	the	face	of	it,	
these	are	exactly	the	sort	of	metaphysical	claims	from	which	they	elsewhere	claim	to	
refrain.	I’m	sure	many	anthropologists	will	be	open	to	persuasion	on	these	points,	if	
arguments	for	them	are	made,	but	they	do	need	to	be	made.	It	is	also	left	unsaid	whether	
things	still	go	about	reinventing	themselves	when	no	anthropologist	is	looking.		
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The	second	way	in	which	this	book	suggests	a	future	for	the	ontological	turn	is	in	rising	to	
the	challenge	of	addressing	ethnography	that	is	not	of	places	which	the	earlier	version	
described	as	having	‘other	ontologies’,	and	also	phenomena	that	are	not	readily	captured	by	
a	stress	on	relationality.	The	example	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	choose	is	conversion	to	
Christianity.	Like	the	previous	chapter,	this	one	is	brimming	with	new	ideas.	The	one	that	
caught	my	attention	most	takes	off	from	the	familiar	observation	that	Christian	converts	
often	sever	relations	with	kin	and	others.	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	ask	the	slightly	
unexpected	question:	where	do	those	relations	go?	They	observe,	as	again	have	many	
others,	that	such	people	also	often	self-consciously	develop	new	relations	with	themselves:	
practices	of	self-cultivation	such	as	confession,	and	so	on.	The	new	idea	here	is	not,	as	
Holbraad	and	Pedersen	claim,	that	of	a	‘self-relational	individual’,	as	they	put	it.	That	idea	is	
well	established,	not	least	from	having	been	rather	elaborately	developed	by	Foucault	in	the	
later	volumes	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	and	elsewhere.	What	is	new	is	the	suggestion	that	
this	interior	elaboration	is	caused	by	the	folding	inwards	of	the	relationality	that	formerly	
was	expressed	externally,	in	relations	with	others.	The	warrant	they	give	for	this	they	take	
from	Strathern,	and	her	point	that	at	whatever	scale	observation	is	conducted	(from	
galaxies	to	sub-atomic	particles,	by	way	of	‘global	structures’	and	‘local	communities’),	
observers	will	find	the	same	order	of	information,	and	this	will	sustain	the	same	degree	of	
complexity	in	conceptualisation.	But	this	idea,	which	I	have	always	taken	to	be	an	
observation	about	the	activity	of	observing	(indeed	about	specific	practices	of	observing),	is	
here	interpreted	as	a	kind	of	law	of	conservation	of	relations:	those	that	have	disappeared	
between	individuals	must	have	gone	somewhere,	and	this	explains	the	‘swelling’	of	the	
individual	with	interiorized	relations.	This	is	an	intriguing	and	attractive	idea,	although	I	can	
see	no	reason	why	it	should	be	true,	nor	any	sense	in	which	Strathern	provides	authority	for	
it.	But	I	can	see	that	it	is	a	potentially	very	fruitful	suggestion	in	terms	of	raising	fascinating	
questions	for	ethnographic	research,	and	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	individualism.		
	
This	book	could	be	read	overall	in	at	least	two	ways.	First,	it	might	be	taken	as	a	
comprehensive	prospectus	for	anthropology:	a	set	of	rules	for	what	anthropologists	should	
and	shouldn’t	do	and	criteria	of	excellence	for	anthropological	analysis.	But	read	this	way	it	
would	be	not	at	all	satisfactory.	There	is	no	discussion	of	how	the	conceptual	innovation	it	
encourages	might	relate	to	anything	we	might	call	‘theory’	or	what	scope	there	might	be	for	
explanation	of	any	kind.	How	would	this	kind	of	anthropology	comport	with	historical	
knowledge,	regional	traditions	of	scholarship,	or	other	disciplines?	At	the	most	basic	level,	
should	we	expect	that	a	concept	generated	as	they	suggest	in	one	ethnographic	encounter	
will	prove	itself	in	use	beyond	its	original	context,	however	that	is	to	be	defined?	The	idiom	
of	experimentation	runs	throughout	the	book.	At	one	point	the	authors	suggest	that	success	
for	the	whole	procedure	should	be	measured	by,	‘the	degree	to	which	potentially	useful	
concepts	have	been	generated	by	this	heuristic	procedure,	and	more	generally	the	extent	to	
which	this	ontological	experiment	has	explicated,	problematized	and	improved	existing	
ways	of	thinking’	(p.	23),	but	there	is	no	discussion	of	criteria	of	experimental	design	(what	
differentiates	a	good	from	a	bad	experiment?),	or	of	how	the	results	of	an	experiment	are	
to	be	assessed	(what	might	count	as	‘useful’?).	If	we	have	no	such	criteria,	then	we	are	not	
really	conducting	experiments,	and	talk	of	‘heuristics’	is	a	bit	of	a	cop	out;	we	are	just	trying	
out	something	new	and	seeing	if	we	like	it.		
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There	are	points	at	which	the	book	seems	to	suggest	that	it	be	read	this	way.	So	for	
instance,	in	the	course	of	their	discussion	of	Viveiros	de	Castro’s	idea	of	‘ontological	self-
determination’,	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	suggest	that	anthropology	should	reject	the	task	of	
describing	and	interpreting	the	world	as	it	is:	a	world	of	nation	states,	institutions,	unequal	
distribution	of	power,	etc.	Instead,	they	suggest	that	we	should	be	in	the	business	of	
‘imagining	and	conceptually	elaborating	ethnographically	motivated	alternatives’	to	the	
world	as	it	is	(p.	196).	But	making	sense	of	this	proposal	–	distinguishing	it	from	the	kind	of	
romantic	fantasy	anyone	might	go	in	for	–	requires	spelling	out	what	‘ethnographically	
motivated’	might	mean,	and	that	has	got	to	require	standards	of	faithful	description	of	the	
world	as	it	actually	is	–	nation	states,	institutions,	inequality,	and	all.	We	should	indeed	be	
open,	as	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	rightly	say,	to	learning	from	our	informants	that	there	are	
things	in	the	world	we	formerly	didn’t	know	about,	to	having	our	ontological	assumptions	
revised	and	developing	new	concepts	in	response.	But	this	stance	is	weakened	rather	than	
strengthened	when	they	gloss	it	by	saying	not	that	we	might	hope	to	learn	that	things	are	
actually	other	than	we	thought,	but	merely	that	they	‘could	be	otherwise’	(p.	68).	‘I	
discovered	radical	alterity	and	it	made	me	dream	a	dream’,	is	not	the	basis	of	a	scholarly	
discipline.	And	indeed,	the	most	striking	images	they	use	for	anthropological	enquiry	are	of	
artistic	performance,	in	which	all	the	stress	is	on	novelty	and	virtuosity.	At	one	point	
(following	Wagner)	they	liken	it	to	jazz	improvisation,	and	call	for,	‘an	anthropology	of	solos,	
or	even	anthropology	as	solos’	(p.	69,	emphasis	in	the	original);	at	another	it	is	a	sort	of	
conceptual	art	in	reverse,	‘producing	conceptualizations	that	express	in	abstract	form	a	set	
of	concrete	realities’	(p.	241).	All	in	all,	the	idea	they	suggested	to	me	was	of	a	variety	show,	
with	one	virtuoso	performance	after	another,	each	demonstrating	their	individuality	and	
flair,	but	with	no	necessary	relation	with	each	other,	no	implications	of	one	for	any	other,	
and	no	sense	of	cumulative	endeavour.	And	if	their	formula	of	reflexivity,	conceptualization,	
and	experimentation	were	taken	to	be	a	sufficient	blue-print	for	anthropology	as	a	whole,	
this	is	all	it	could	be.		
	
But	for	much	of	the	time,	the	book	admits	of	a	different	and	much	more	satisfying	reading:	
not	as	a	comprehensive	prescription	for	the	discipline,	but	as	a	recipe	very	specifically	for	
generating	those	‘a-ha!	moments’.	And	although	from	one	point	of	view	that	is	rather	a	
limited	aspect	of	anthropology,	it	is	very	far	from	being	trivial.	Indeed,	I	think	the	claim	the	
authors	presuppose,	that	it	is	in	some	ways	essential	to	the	discipline,	has	a	good	deal	to	be	
said	for	it.	It	isn’t	our	exclusive	preserve	–	for	many	kinds	of	historians	too	it	is	of	the	
essence	–	but	there	are	reasons	why	such	historians	so	often	look	to	anthropology	for	ideas	
about	how	to	address	the	challenges	they	face.	Holbraad	and	Pedersen’s	programme	makes	
best	sense,	then,	as	the	most	sustained	and	concerted,	most	self-consciously	radical	and	
fundamental	rethinking	of	this	defining	aspect	of	the	discipline.	It	is	a	relentlessly	
intellectual,	single-minded,	in	some	ways	strikingly	ascetic	programme	–	ignore	a	lot	else	
and	focus	on	this	extremely	demanding	challenge	of	putting	your	ethnographic	data	before	
your	own	certainties	–	whether	derived	from	your	preferred	social	theory	or	from	common	
sense.	‘The	ultimate	goal	of	the	ontological	turn	is	to	take	the	things	that	people	in	the	field	
say,	do	or	use,	so	seriously	that	they	trump	all	metaphysical	claims	made	by	any	political,	
religious	or	academic	authority,	including	(and	this	is	where	things	become	both	tricky	and	
interesting)	the	authority	that	we	assume	in	making	this	very	claim’	(p.	287).	Actually,	things	
become	tricky	and	interesting	much	earlier	than	that	(what	if	the	people	in	the	field	are	
political,	religious,	or	academic	authorities?;	how	many	different	such	things	can	we	take	
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seriously	at	the	same	time?)	and	therefore	long	before	it	is	taken	to	this	(logical?,	limit?,	
extreme?)	point,	at	which	it	becomes	self-confuting,	it	is	a	highly	productive	goal	for	
anthropologists	to	set	themselves.			
	
This	is	a	remarkable	book,	and	every	intellectually	serious	anthropologist	will	find	it	a	
challenging	and	thought-provoking	read.	Only	a	minority,	I	think,	will	be	convinced	by	
everything	they	find	in	it,	and	there	are	other	ways	than	those	recommended	here	to	
respond	to	some	of	the	challenges	it	raises,	but	still	fewer	serious	readers,	I	think,	will	be	
entirely	unaffected.	It	is	a	book	that	deserves	to	and	probably	will	have	a	deep	impact	on	
how	anthropologists	go	about	their	business.	
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